Coalition formation in waste-to-energy problem of municipalities: municipal unions' negotiations and waste management network design

Coalition formation in waste-to-energy problem of municipalities: municipal unions' negotiations and waste management network design

Článek WoS

The article focuses on a study of different models of cooperation between municipalities under the assumption of banned landfilling. At first, the problem is formulated as a cooperative game, where municipalities are trying to form municipal unions to minimize their waste treatment cost under the assumption of the limited capacities of Waste-to-Energy plants. However, the transportation limitations are not incorporated into the characteristic function. The defined game is thoroughly studied from a theoretical point of view, and the implications of the game's properties for real-world problems are discussed. The found properties demonstrate that the proposed model is reasonable and reflects the rational behavior of municipalities in the negotiation process. Therefore, this initial model can serve as a solid foundation for further research of its modifications. Then, the setting is enriched by the strategical waste transportation described as a vehicle routing problem with multiple depots (Waste-to-Energy plants) and the possibility of splitting waste collection between routes. Compared to the initial formulation, the problem utilizes an optimistic approach. The application of distributed dynamic coalition formation to model municipalities' negotiations produces more cost-effective municipal unions (and routes) in every iteration. However, the resulting solutions do not respect the capacity constraint of Waste-to-Energy plants. After the theoretical study of the problem, the stable coalition structure for an optimally designed waste management network has been found analytically. However, this theoretically optimal proposal should not be financially possible with respect to the considered budget. A novel heuristic algorithm that handles games with hundreds of players has been proposed to overcome this complication. The algorithm searches for such design of Waste-to-Energy plants' capacities that the total costs of municipalities will be minimal concerning a given number of routes (reflecting capacities). The functionality of the proposed approach is highlighted in the exemplary case study of the Zl & iacute;n region of the Czech Republic. The proposed algorithm has been applied to design a waste management network and to re-design the existing network. In particular, the optimal number of newly added routes, with respect to the resulting net savings, has been established.

The article focuses on a study of different models of cooperation between municipalities under the assumption of banned landfilling. At first, the problem is formulated as a cooperative game, where municipalities are trying to form municipal unions to minimize their waste treatment cost under the assumption of the limited capacities of Waste-to-Energy plants. However, the transportation limitations are not incorporated into the characteristic function. The defined game is thoroughly studied from a theoretical point of view, and the implications of the game's properties for real-world problems are discussed. The found properties demonstrate that the proposed model is reasonable and reflects the rational behavior of municipalities in the negotiation process. Therefore, this initial model can serve as a solid foundation for further research of its modifications. Then, the setting is enriched by the strategical waste transportation described as a vehicle routing problem with multiple depots (Waste-to-Energy plants) and the possibility of splitting waste collection between routes. Compared to the initial formulation, the problem utilizes an optimistic approach. The application of distributed dynamic coalition formation to model municipalities' negotiations produces more cost-effective municipal unions (and routes) in every iteration. However, the resulting solutions do not respect the capacity constraint of Waste-to-Energy plants. After the theoretical study of the problem, the stable coalition structure for an optimally designed waste management network has been found analytically. However, this theoretically optimal proposal should not be financially possible with respect to the considered budget. A novel heuristic algorithm that handles games with hundreds of players has been proposed to overcome this complication. The algorithm searches for such design of Waste-to-Energy plants' capacities that the total costs of municipalities will be minimal concerning a given number of routes (reflecting capacities). The functionality of the proposed approach is highlighted in the exemplary case study of the Zl & iacute;n region of the Czech Republic. The proposed algorithm has been applied to design a waste management network and to re-design the existing network. In particular, the optimal number of newly added routes, with respect to the resulting net savings, has been established.

VRP; CVRP; Game theory; Coalition formation; Waste management; Network design

VRP; CVRP; Game theory; Coalition formation; Waste management; Network design

ERYGANOV, I.; ŠOMPLÁK, R.; NEVRLÝ, V.

SPRINGER

DORDRECHT

1573-2924

OPTIMIZATION AND ENGINEERING

Spojené státy americké

38

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11081-025-10007-y