Detail publikačního výsledku

Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

HORNÍČKOVÁ, T.; PŘEUČIL, T.; NOVOTNÝ, M.; MARTINÁSEK, Z.

Originální název

Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

Anglický název

Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

Druh

Stať ve sborníku v databázi WoS či Scopus

Originální abstrakt

Cryptography is omnipresent in our daily life, as we need it for trusted authentication (e.g., in access systems), secure communication, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, and many more. However, even if mathematically secure ciphers are used, the device running the cryptographic algorithms is still vul-nerable to side-channel attacks that may reveal the secrets. These attacks exploit the fact that power consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the device depends on processed data. To prevent such an attack, the designer must employ countermeasures, such as masking, hiding, or shuffling. In this paper, we focus on Microchip CEC1702 microcontroller that supports common cryptographic operations in hardware. We analyze the resistance of its AES accelerator against correlation power analysis (CPA). We analyzed 100 million power traces by first-order CPA and univariate second-order CPA. In neither case did we find any vulnerability.

Anglický abstrakt

Cryptography is omnipresent in our daily life, as we need it for trusted authentication (e.g., in access systems), secure communication, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, and many more. However, even if mathematically secure ciphers are used, the device running the cryptographic algorithms is still vul-nerable to side-channel attacks that may reveal the secrets. These attacks exploit the fact that power consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the device depends on processed data. To prevent such an attack, the designer must employ countermeasures, such as masking, hiding, or shuffling. In this paper, we focus on Microchip CEC1702 microcontroller that supports common cryptographic operations in hardware. We analyze the resistance of its AES accelerator against correlation power analysis (CPA). We analyzed 100 million power traces by first-order CPA and univariate second-order CPA. In neither case did we find any vulnerability.

Klíčová slova

AES; CEC1702; ChipWhisperer; CPA; Higher-order CPA; PicoScope; SICAK; Side-channel attacks

Klíčová slova v angličtině

AES; CEC1702; ChipWhisperer; CPA; Higher-order CPA; PicoScope; SICAK; Side-channel attacks

Autoři

HORNÍČKOVÁ, T.; PŘEUČIL, T.; NOVOTNÝ, M.; MARTINÁSEK, Z.

Rok RIV

2025

Vydáno

10.06.2023

Nakladatel

IEEE

Místo

Budva, Montenegro

ISBN

9798350322910

Kniha

12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing, MECO 2023

Strany od

1

Strany do

4

Strany počet

4

BibTex

@inproceedings{BUT197162,
  author="Tereza {Horníčková} and Tomáš {Přeučil} and Martin {Novotný} and Zdeněk {Martinásek}",
  title="Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702",
  booktitle="12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing, MECO 2023",
  year="2023",
  pages="1--4",
  publisher="IEEE",
  address="Budva, Montenegro",
  doi="10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10155040",
  isbn="9798350322910"
}