Distributed Participation to Threshold Signature Analyzed via Game Theory

Distributed Participation to Threshold Signature Analyzed via Game Theory

Paper in proceedings (conference paper)

We investigate the performance of a distributed threshold signature scheme, where at least t out of n signers must participate to authenticate a message. We model this scheme as a participation game, where individual signers choose whether to submit their contribution to the (t,n) signature with a certain probability and incur a cost in doing so. We discuss the resulting Nash equilibria of the game and specifically investigate the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which corresponds to a stable operating point of distributed decisions made individually by the agents. Finally, we show how tweaking the information revealed to the signers may improve the efficiency of this resulting equilibrium. This study highlights a fundamental trade-off between system-wide efficiency and individual resource consumption. Our proposed mechanism thus provides a practical method for steering a decentralized system towards a more globally efficient outcome without resorting to an impractical and unfair centralized control structure.

We investigate the performance of a distributed threshold signature scheme, where at least t out of n signers must participate to authenticate a message. We model this scheme as a participation game, where individual signers choose whether to submit their contribution to the (t,n) signature with a certain probability and incur a cost in doing so. We discuss the resulting Nash equilibria of the game and specifically investigate the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which corresponds to a stable operating point of distributed decisions made individually by the agents. Finally, we show how tweaking the information revealed to the signers may improve the efficiency of this resulting equilibrium. This study highlights a fundamental trade-off between system-wide efficiency and individual resource consumption. Our proposed mechanism thus provides a practical method for steering a decentralized system towards a more globally efficient outcome without resorting to an impractical and unfair centralized control structure.

Threshold signature; Game theory; Distributed control; Participatory games; Secret sharing

Threshold signature; Game theory; Distributed control; Participatory games; Secret sharing

BURATTO, A.; RICCI, S.; DZURENDA, P.; BADIA, L.

2026

04.11.2025

979-8-3315-7675-2

2025 17th International Congress on Ultra Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT)

International Congress on Ultra Modern Telecommunications and Workshops

11

United States of America

311

316

6

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11268559